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Enterprises in post-socialist and transition economies often participate in providing infrastructure 
and social services to the surrounding community. We argue that this bundling of social and infra-
structure goods provision with an enterprise’s core operations is a fully rational choice in an uncer-
tain environment. Using a stylized model, we show that this activity can be largely related to efforts 
by firms to increase their operational reliability. Our unique survey data suggest that this manifests 
itself through provision of more reliable infrastructure, stronger employee attachment to the firm, 
and better relations with the authorities.  
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Monissa kehittyvissä talouksissa, erityisesti entisen Neuvostoliiton alueella, yritykset osallistuvat 
huomattavissa määrin julkisen infrastruktuurin ja sosiaalipalveluiden tuottamiseen. Tässä tutkimuk-
sessa osoitetaan teoreettisen mallin avulla, että julkisen infrastruktuurin ja sosiaalipalveluiden tuot-
taminen on täysin rationaalinen keino lisätä yrityksen liiketoimintaympäristön varmuutta. Käytetty 
mikrotason empiirinen aineisto tukee mallin tuloksia. Yritykset hyötyvät infrastruktuurin ja sosiaa-
lipalveluiden tuottamisesta kolmea kautta: suoraan luotettavammin toimivan perusinfrastruktuurin 
ja työvoiman liikkuvuuden supistumisen kautta sekä epäsuorasti ylläpitämällä parempia suhteita 
paikalliseen julkisvaltaan.  
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1  Introduction  
 
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor views ef-
ficient public service delivery as key ingredient in promoting economic growth and eradicating 
poverty. The incentive for firms to invest, however, is significantly reduced when firms face issues 
of operational reliability. For example, the availability of basic infrastructure services needs to be 
sufficient for the intended business purpose. A company that must constantly put up with daily 
blackouts of the electrical grid or interruptions in its phone and internet access may soon find its 
profitability overwhelmed. By the same token, firms are averse to entering a business environment 
where the challenge of maintaining a stable workforce is complicated by inadequate basic public 
services in such areas as health care or primary education. Poor access to public services translates 
to increased labor costs and lower productivity. Finally, serious social imbalances can emerge, es-
pecially in company towns, when the dominant employer fails to assure members of the broader 
community of access to daily necessities. 
In the Soviet era, large enterprises in Russia were typically expected to participate in pro-
vision of local infrastructure such as energy and district heating, as well as the provision of social 
services such as housing, medical care and day care. With the collapse of the Soviet system, many 
such social assets were transferred to municipal ownership. Russia experienced a major shift of re-
sponsibility for infrastructure (Leksin and Shvetsov, 1998; Commander and Schankerman, 1997.) 
Although more than a decade has elapsed since the transfers of assets under the law on di-
vestiture of enterprise social assets should have been completed, many Russian firms continue to 
support vestiges of the socialist arrangement. It is not uncommon to see large industrial enterprises 
providing social services or producing and supporting local infrastructure goods. Generally speak-
ing, these supported activities have little, if anything, to do with the core business functions of the 
enterprise. Indeed, Haaparanta et al. (2003) report enterprise managers readily acknowledge that 
these supported activities do not contribute directly to their bottom lines. While part of this com-
mitment to upkeep of legacy facilities and institutions can be attributed to tradition, it still raises the 
larger question of what would motivate a profit-maximizing, privately owned enterprise to keep 
funding non-profitable cost centers year in and year out. 
Based on a simple model of firm utility maximization under uncertainty, we argue that this 
apparently altruistic provision of social services and infrastructure goods (sometimes portrayed as 
“corporate social responsibility”) can be explained as a rational response by firms to an uncertain Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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operating environment.
1
2  Private goods, social goods, and infrastructure in Russia 
 Our basic assertion is that firms use these activities to maximize their op-
erational reliability in surroundings where financial markets fail to provide adequate possibilities for 
hedging against risk or where risk is largely institutional. 
Operational reliability can be enhanced through several channels. First, firms can influence 
the availability of municipal infrastructure by directly participating in its planning, construction, and 
operation. Second, providing social services to workers in surroundings where public provision is 
otherwise poor enables firms to better retain workers and thereby avoid production problems caused 
by loss of trained personnel. Third, the provision of infrastructure and services, under the right cir-
cumstances, can enhance relations between the firm and the public sector, and thereby promote a 
regulatory environment friendly to the firm.  
In the following discussion, we present a theoretical model of firm optimization in an envi-
ronment where the firm can affect its operational reliability through engagement in provision of so-
cial services or infrastructure. Based on survey data from Russia, we consider the empirical evi-
dence that supports the theoretical setting.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and 
the provision of social and infrastructure goods in the Russian industrial context. Section 3 presents 
our model of firm optimization in an uncertain environment. Section 4 presents our empirical evi-




The Soviet economic system led to a blurring of the division of public and private provision of ba-
sic infrastructure and numerous social services. Municipal infrastructure and social services were 
provided under to the official plan by the city or individual state-owned enterprises. In Russia’s 
monocities (single enterprise towns), as well as cities with just a few large enterprises, the citizenry 
was largely dependent on their local enterprises for services. The demise of the planned economy 
and subsequent privatization of state assets in the early 1990s has been particularly traumatic for 
these populations. 
Russia adopted laws requiring divestiture of housing and most other social assets in 1992 
and 1993. Instead of immediate privatization, however, assets were divested to local authorities, 
                                                 
1 According to one definition, corporate social responsibility involves “actions on the part of the firm that appear to ad-
vance the promotion of some social good beyond the immediate interest of the firm or shareholders and beyond legal 
requirements.” (McWilliams and Siegel (2001).  
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who willingly, or otherwise, shouldered the responsibility for providing the community services 
previously provided by the divesting enterprises. As planned, the transfer in ownership of enter-
prises social assets was largely implemented on schedule by the end of 1997. Some 80% of hous-
ing, kindergartens, medical clinics, sports facilities and children’s summer camps, along with 60-
70% of recreational facilities shifted to municipal ownership during 1993-1997. 
Local authorities, who typically lacked sufficient funds to operate or maintain the divested 
facilities, were hardly enthusiastic about what they had been stuck with  − an d even less pleased 
about their lack of say in the divestiture process. During the 1990s, in particular, insufficient fund-
ing and ambiguous property rights meant municipalities had little incentive to properly maintain 






cate firms in Russia routinely experienced problems with availability of basic infrastructure in the 
early 2000s (see Table 1). This finding was reinforced by the EBRD’s low rating for Russian infra-
structure quality a year later (EBRD, 2004). The share of municipalized assets ranges widely in 
Russia, between 15% and 100%.  
 
 Table 1  Interruptions in basic infrastructure services in 2002 
% of firms that have 
experienced inter-
ruptions 
Of those: % that regard 
the interruptions as signif-
icant 
Mean / median 
length of interrup-
tions, days 
Electricity  38.6  48.8  7.3 / 2 
Water  30.0  32.0  8.1 / 3 
Telephone  30.9  39.1  8.6 / 5 
Gas  10.5  39.1  18.1 / 3 
Heating  10.2  30.4  12.5 / 7 
Source: HSE/CEFIR/BOFIT enterprise survey data. For details, see Haaparanta et al. (2003). 
 
Russia’s large enterprises remain critically important for infrastructure provision. For example, an 
enterprise could well be the sole building-heating provider for its legacy apartment buildings or the 
surrounding housing district. Three-quarters of Russian industrial firms supply building-heating 
services, with half of those providing heating to outside users (Solanko, 2006). Besides supplying 
building-heating and electricity, many firms support other public infrastructure. Almost a quarter of 
all enterprises help with construction and maintenance of roads outside their plant area. A sizeable 
                                                 
2 See Section 4 and Haaparanta et al. (2003) for a survey description. 
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portion of the enterprises support local heating, electricity, and water networks. (Haaparanta et al., 
2003).  
 
Table 2  Support of firms for construction or maintenance of municipal infrastructure 
 
 
Form of municipal infra-
structure 
% of firms giving 
financial support to 
maintenance or 
construction of 









If firm owns ne-
cessary facilities, 
% of firms giving 
either form of 
support 
Municipal heating  10.9  10.2  16.6  18.0 
Municipal electricity  7.7  7.7  11.9  11.1 
Railroads not owned by firm  5.5  4.2  7.7  12.2 
Local gas network  6.5  4.2  8.4  n.a. 
Municipal water system  10.6  9.4  17.3  n.a. 
Municipal waste collection  10.9  7.7  15.4  n.a. 
Roads outside plant area  19.9  10.4  24.1  n.a. 
Source: HSE/CEFIR/BOFIT enterprise survey data. For details, see Haaparanta et al. (2003).                       
 
Many large industrial firms provide or finance a wide array of social services (see Table 3). In the 
case of firms providing housing services, over half provide housing to tenants who are not employ-
ees  or members of employee families.  Virtually every manager interviewed in the 
HSE/CEFIR/BOFIT survey considered social asset provision to be unprofitable (Haaparanta et al., 
2003). 
 
Table 3  Social service provision (according to firm manager responses) 
Percentage of firms providing 
the service 
Housing  Medical care  Daycare  Recreation  Other   At least one 
In 1990  78.5  76.7  69.8  38.2  84.4  94.6 
In 2002  (assets built after 1990)  15.1  n.a.  2.0  4.7  17.6  32.4 
Offer or support in 2002   55.7  90.8  26  73.3  76.5  97.8 
Offer in full  34.2  67.1  10.4  20.8  76.5  91.8 
Support assets transferred 
to municipality  5.0  4.0  6.7  0.3  n.a.  14.1 
Direct financial aid to em-
ployees  22.0  42.1  8.9  58.7  n.a.  76.2 
Other form of support  11.4  8.2  3.0  4.5  n.a.  22.0 
Of those giving support, user 
base extends beyond em-
ployees and their families 
55.6  38.7  41.9  29.4  n.a.  62.3 
Source: HSE/CEFIR/BOFIT enterprise survey data. For details, see Haaparanta et al. (2003). 
 
What are the possible rationales for continued engagement in the provision of social and infrastruc-
ture goods? Certainly, much of the physical capital of Russian firms was inherited from the Soviet  
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era, when industrial projects were constructed with a comprehensive view to community needs. In 
the absence of this legacy of non-plant assets and commitments, it is highly unlikely that firms in 
Russia would today engage in service and infrastructure provision to the extent they do.  
More importantly, however, it appears firms engage in these activities to increase their op-
erational reliability in highly insecure environments. By providing social and infrastructure goods, 
firms tackle three issues: availability and quality of basic infrastructure services, attachment of la-
bor, and assuaging local officials.  
 
Availability and quality of basic infrastructure services. As Table 1 points out, interruptions in 
basic infrastructure supply continue to be commonplace in Russia. Thus, firms seek to increase the 
quality and availability of local infrastructure to maximize their own capital input. Firms can assist 
in the provision of infrastructure services with financial or non-financial support or by producing 
the infrastructure good themselves. 
 
Attachment of labor. Where public social services are otherwise scarce, workers give high value to 
such services from the employer. By providing workers with social services, the firm is able to at-
tach its labor force.
3
Assuaging local officials. In their analysis Lavrov, Litwack, and Sutherland (2000) argue that re-
gions and localities in Russia favor large incumbent firms capable of providing public goods. Cash-
constrained regional and local governments, which have a duty to provide traditional public goods 
such as education and health care, as well as heating and road upkeep, have an incentive to cooper-
ate with local enterprises with resources to provide statutorily mandated public services. Enterprise-
municipality cooperation is a two-way street: the municipality fulfills its mandates and the firm ex-
tracts beneficial treatment from municipal authorities. Influential firms may even engage in what 
Frye and Zhuravskaya (2002) describe as elite exchange: enterprises receive favorable treatment for 




                                                 
3 For a thorough discussion, see Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006b). 
4 For more discussion on relations between various levels of public administration and the private sector in Russia, see 
Solanko (2006) and Haaparanta and Juurikkala (2007) and the references therein. 
 
 On the other hand, in an economy characterized by inse-
cure property rights, rigid rules with wide latitude for interpretation, and a poorly functioning judi-Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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ciary, a local bureaucrat may greatly harm or help any business operations. Firms must try to adjust 
to such conditions in any case.  
Here, we assume that firms gain preferential treatment from authorities when they partici-
pate in municipal provision of infrastructure and social services (infrasoc provision) and face a 
threat of sanctions when they dissociate themselves from it. Social assets may also be used to lobby 




3  Optimal firm behavior under institutional uncertainty 
 
Röller and Zhang (2005) envisage a transition country framework and examine how an exogenously 
given requirement for bundling social services with employee compensation may harm efficiency 
due to soft budget constraints. Here, we examine the case where firms endogenously choose to par-
ticipate in social service and infrastructure provision, and propose a stylized model of enterprise 
behavior in an institutionally uncertain business environment. 
The ground-breaking papers of Sandmo (1971) and Leland (1972) offer a model in which 
the firm seeks to maximize its expected utility from profits rather than directly maximize expected 
profits. The body of literature on firm decision-making under uncertainty that resulted from this in-
sight provides a rich and fairly realistic framework for analysis of risk-laden business environments 
typical of transition economies like Russia. Moreover, this new approach avoids the standard risk-
neutrality assumption of perfect capital markets (rarely the case in transition economies). 
We now build on the assumption of a common von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function 
for the firm’s decision-makers. Following Sandmo’s (1971) argument, we assume that the prefer-
ences of decision-makers in most firms are sufficiently similar to guarantee the existence of a group 
preference function. This assumption is especially plausible for insider-owned firms, a common 
form of ownership in Russia (Angelucci et al., 2002). 
The uncertainty literature (e.g. Hau, 2004) typically focuses on uncertainties related to de-
mand and price of the firm’s production.
5
                                                 
5 A comprehensive survey is provided in Bauer (2005). 
 To stylize our firm optimization model, we depart from 
this traditional emphasis in two ways. First, uncertainty in our model lies in the probability distribu-
tion. For simplicity, we assume certainty concerning price and demand. Second, the firm in our 
model is able to influence its probability distribution through spending on infrastructure and social  
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goods. We generalize the approach presented in McKenna (1985, Ch. 4.2.) where the firm faces two 
possible world states, to an insurance-type setting where the firm can affect the probability distribu-
tion.
6




Assume a price and wage-taking firm with four inputs: labor, capital, a social good, and an infra-
structure good. To keep the model as simple as possible, we consider a short-term production func-
tion so capital input is fixed, and include only two outcomes: a good (i.e. well-performing) state 
with positive production and a breakdown (i.e. collapsing) state, where production falls to zero. The 
firm faces the risk of a production breakdown of probability 1-q. The novelty of this model is that 
its probability distribution depends on three variables: a fully exogenous variable B, and goods 
variables S and I, q=q ( I,S,B). The firm can affect the probability of a good state, q, with its two 
inputs, social good S and infrastructure good I. 
An increase in the social good, i.e. social services the firm provides for some or all of the 
workforce, results in better social services in such areas as health care. Provision of social services, 
in turn, helps the firm bind workers in a tight labor market or improve the firm’s standing with local 
administrators. This enhances the probability a good state will emerge. Social services provided by 
the employer are also likely to improve the productivity of the workforce, especially in an environ-
ment where public provision is weak. Thus, we assume the social good positively affects both the 
probability of a good state and the firm’s labor efficiency. 
The infrastructure good, which includes activities such as repairing the electrical grid, is a 
non-traditional input in that it only affects the probability of a good state through more reliable in-
frastructure supply to the firm or through better connections to the locality. As the firm cannot con-
trol the probability distribution completely, the probability of good state q also depends on an ex-
ogenous variable B, which diminishes the probability of the good state. Unexpected impediments to 
a good state might include the installation of a corrupt municipal leader or the malfunction of the 
main pump at the local water utility. Such occurrences increase B, which translates into the lower 
probability of a good state with a given I and S. 
 
                                                 
6 For a similar insurance-taking individual application, see e.g. Shavell (1987). Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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Assume firm with certain demand maximizing expected utility from good and bad states by choos-
ing L, I, S so that 
 
{ } ) ( )) , , ( 1 ( ) ( ) , , ( ) ( 2 1 π π π U B S I q U B S I q EU MAX − + =   ,      (1) 
   (L,I,S) 
where  
 




R I L S w + − + − = λ λ π ) ( 2  .                (3) 
                               
 
are the profits in good and bad state (π1 > π2 > 0). The probability of good state q is an increasing 
function of infrastructure and social expenditures, i.e. q = q(I,S,B) with qS, qI > 0 and qSS, qII < 0 
and a decreasing function of B. The natural assumption here is that the cross- derivatives qSB and qIB 
are positive, indicating a stronger marginal effect of I and S to q in the case of an increase in the ex-
ogenous risk variable. Finally, we assume the firm is risk averse, so U’(π)>0 and U’’(π)<0. These 
are the key assumptions of our model. Q(φ(S)L)  is a typical concave production function, where 
φ(S) is a concave labor input efficiency function with argument of firm’s social provision S. Thus, S 
is measured in monetary terms as to the extent it increases the efficiency of the firm’s workers. It 
can also be directly added to the cost side of the firm’s operations as with the given wage level w. 
Moreover, infrastructure provision, I,  can also be measured in monetary terms and added to the 
firm’s costs. I enters the firm’s production function indirectly via the expected utility presentation 
of production uncertainty. In other words, I does not increase the firm’s production like S; it only 
increases the probability that the firm will perform well. While the costs of social services increase 
in relation to size of labor force, actions such as fixing a broken power line secures the electricity 
supply for the firm irrespective of the how much it produces. The exogenous parameter λ represents 
physical inheritance and takes a value between zero and one. As discussed earlier, much of the capi-
tal assets of Russian firms are a legacy from the Soviet era. This inheritance significantly dimin-
ishes costs involved in infrastructure and social good participation. Parameter λ is one minus the 
share of I and S that is inherited, or a value of one if nothing was inherited from the Soviet period.
7
                                                 
7 Purely for notational simplicity, we assume λ to be the same for both I and S. We could easily give different inheri-
tance parameters for I and S without affecting the results. 
 
Finally, we assume that the firm has asset incomes R to cover the losses involved with the bad pro-
duction state.  
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The maximization problem in details is 
 




The first-order conditions under assumption that interior maximization solution exists are    
 
   A1)  




1 * = − − − + − − =
∂
∂
= S w U q S w S Q qU
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U E
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   B1)   








1 * = − − − − =
∂
∂
= π λ π λ π π U q U q qU U q
I
U E
I I I I
 
 
   C1)    








1 * = − − + − + =
∂
∂
= L U q U q Q qU U q
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3.2   Implications of the results 
 
We now analyze how changes in uncertainty affect the firm’s behavior. Utilizing the implicit func-




) *)( ( ' ' ) 1 ( ' ' *) ( ' ) ' *)( ( ' '







1 1 2 >
− − − + + − −
+ − + −
=
S w U q e Q qU S w e Q qU
e Q U U U S w
dq
dL
λ π π λ π
π π π λ
 .      (5) 
 
The positive sign of (5) follows from the fact that the denominator is negative due to the second de-
rivatives in each term and as the term in brackets in the nominator is positive. In similar fashion, we 
obtain dL/dB<0 which is identical to (5) with the exception that nominator is multiplied by qB re-
versing the sign. Thus, a firm operating in the current setting employs fewer workers in a less cer-
tain environment and reacts to an increase in the exogenous “risk shock” B by lowering its labor 
demand. Note that these results hold irrespective of the rate of risk aversion or the efficiency rate of 
S. Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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Concerning infrastructure and social good expenditures, we base our analysis again on to-
tal differentiation. From B2) and C2), we get the following relations, whereby U(π1
*) and others are 
replaced by U(1) etc. to ease notation: 
 
[ ]
) 2 ( ' ' )) 2 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ' ' ( )) 1 ( ' ) 2 ( ' ( 2 )) 2 ( ) 1 ( (
)) 1 ( ' ) 2 ( ' ( )) 2 ( ( ) 1 ( (
2 2 U U U q U U q U U q







+ − + − + −
− + − −
=




[ ] [ ]
Ω
+ − + − −
=
L U L Q U q U U q
dB
dS B SB ) 2 ( ' ) ' ' )( 1 ( ' )) 2 ( ) 1 ( ( λ λ ϕ
    ,            (7)
   
where      
+ + − + − = Ω L U U Q q U U q S SS )) 2 ( ' ) 1 ( ' ) ' ' (( 2 )) 2 ( ) 1 ( ( λ λ ϕ  
2 2 2 ) 2 ( ' ' ) 1 ( )) ' ' )( 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ' ) ' ' ' ' ' ' (( L U q L Q LU U Q L Q q λ λ ϕ ϕ ϕ − + − + + +
. 
 
Unfortunately, the differentials become too complex for an analytical solution. However, we are 
able to get some insight from the relations by examining the effect of firm’s risk aversion. We will 
do this by solving (6) and (7) with a standard constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility func-
tion U(π)=1-e
-γπ, where γ measures the level of risk aversion, i.e. an increase in γ means an increase 
in risk aversion.
8
( ) [ ]
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 2
1

















I II I II
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 This gives results (8) and (9):  
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8 Our qualitative results remain with a standard decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) function U(π)=log(π).  
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Looking at (8), we see that as risk aversion (γ) grows, the nominator tends toward positive as the 
first bracket is positive and second tends to negative. For the denominator, we see that it tends to-
ward negative as γ grows. Thus, the outcome dI/dB<0 becomes more probable as firm becomes 
more risk averse. At first glance, it might seem counter-intuitive that the firm decides to invest less 
in “insuring” itself when it perceives increased uncertainty in its operating environment (e.g. in-
crease in frequency and duration of electrical power outages). However, there is a major difference 
between our setting and the setting with standard insurance. With an insurance contract, the insured 
party secures a certain level of reimbursement in the bad state. Here, our firm does not have that 
luxury. For the firm in our setting, there is no guaranteed reimbursement for I in the realized world 
state no matter how much the firm invests in I. The firm only knows that the probability of the good 
state is higher with higher I. 
Why would a firm, especially a highly risk-averse firm, ever invest in I? Concerning the 
analysis above, we see that the sign is reversed if qIB>γλqB; i.e. if the marginal effectiveness of I on 
q becomes sufficiently large after the increased uncertainty shock.
9
We find similar effect working for S, but the situation is more complex due to the dual ef-
fect of S. In (9), the first term in both the nominator and denominator could be roughly interpreted 
as the risk effect of S, and the second as the efficiency effect. The denominator tends toward nega-
tive as the level of risk aversion rises.
 Thereafter, the firm decides to 
invest more in I even if there is a risk of getting nothing in return. Intuitively, the positive sign of 
(8) becomes increasingly likely with a higher capital inheritance as the costs of I diminish. 
10
Concerning risk aversion and inheritance, the firm’s behavior follows the same logic as 
with infrastructure. Again, it may seem counter-intuitive that larger marginal efficiency gains from 
S contribute negatively to the firm’s willingness to increase S in an uncertainty shock. However, we 
are examining the firm at its optimal level of S. Small marginal efficiency gains mean that firm re-
gards S as beneficial and has initially invested considerably in S,  leaving only small marginal gains 
un-utilized. In contrast, large marginal gains refer to a setting where the firm does not consider S as 
 The nominator tends to positive with increasing γ resulting 
in dS/dB<0. The efficiency gains contribute to the sign of (9) in two ways. For small marginal effi-
ciency gains, the outcome dS/dB>0 is enhanced; for Q’φ’>1, the opposite follows. 
                                                 
9 This is analogous to shifting to a lower level on the q(I) curve where q’(I) is larger. 
10 This follows from the fact that terms where variables are raised to the second power all contribute to the negativity of 
the denominator. Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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beneficial in the first place, meaning the firms is even less likely to do so in the event of a larger 
uncertainty shock. The findings are summarized in Proposition 1 below. 
 
Proposition 1 
A) The less certain the operating environment, the fewer the number of people employed by the 
firm. 
B)  Raising the level of risk aversion tends to decrease I if the exogenous shock risk increases. 
We see an increase in I only when the resulting increase in the marginal effect of I is large 
enough to offset the negative impact of B on q, multiplied by the level of risk aversion. An 
increase in I becomes more likely as the share of inherited I grows. 
C)  Raising the level of risk aversion tends to decrease S if the exogenous shock risk increases. 
This effect is enhanced by large marginal gains, indicating that the firm does not consider S 
to be particularly beneficial in the first place. An increase in S is more likely as the share of 
inherited S grows. 
 
 
4  Empirical evidence 
 
In this section, we present empirical evidence on firm activity in an uncertain environment. Al-
though direct testing of our model is difficult, we can get a sense on how the data line up with the 
model features. We start with a firm performance analysis to see how provision of social services 
and infrastructure goods by the firm is reflected in its performance. We use common explanatory 
variables from performance literature coupled with our unique survey variables on firms’ provision 
of social services and infrastructure goods. Following the performance analysis, we examine the 
three channels through which the firm’s participation in provision of social services and infrastruc-
ture goods enhances the firm’s operational reliability.
11
The HSE/BOFIT/CEFIR survey data on Russian medium-sized and large industrial enter-
prises come out of a survey conducted in spring 2003 that covers 404 large and medium-sized in-
dustrial enterprises in 40 Russian regions. Apart from energy production and minerals extraction, 
the sample is representative of industrial distribution (at the 2-digit level) in Russia. The majority of 
firms in the sample employed between 500 and 5,000 employees. For a thorough discussion of the 
 
                                                 
11 In what follows, these two are referred to as “infrasoc goods.”   
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survey design and implementation, see Haaparanta et al. (2003).
12
4.1   Firm performance and infrasoc participation 
 Descriptions and descriptive sta-
tistics of main variables used are provided in Appendix II. 
 
 
The literature on firm performance in Russia has paid little attention to the question of social ser-
vices and infrastructure. Using a measure of regional transport infrastructure quality, Brown and 
Earle (2000) identify a clear positive effect from better road quality on total factor productivity. 
Otherwise, the performance literature for Russian has concentrated on effects of ownership, soft 
budget constraints, or competition as in Carlin et al. (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002). Re-
inikka and Svensson (2002) address the role of infrastructure on firm performance in other develop-
ing countries.  
Relying on the survey data, we examine the effects of firm’s provision of infrasoc goods 
on firm performance as measured by profit per employee (eprofit).
13
Our standard control variables are capital, finance, internationality, geographical location, 
size of municipality, market power, ownership,
 As explanatory variables we 
have four variables that each depict different aspects of the phenomenon. First, as a variable reflect-
ing firm’s own infrastructure production, we have a dummy (elec_prod) with value of one if the 
firm produced its own electricity in 2002 and zero otherwise. Second, we have the variable (railsup) 
to capture firm support for municipal infrastructure provision. The variable is coded as one if the 
firm provided any financial or non-financial support for the municipal railway system in 2002, and 
zero if no support was given. Third, to analyze social service provision, we have the dummy vari-
able (housing2002) coded as one if firm provided housing or financed housing of its workers in 
2002. Finally, we test the effect of problems in infrastructure delivery on performance. This is con-
trolled with a variable depicting the number of day municipal heat delivery to the firm was inter-
rupted in 2002.  
14
                                                 
12 Our companion papers relying on the same dataset are Juurikkala et Lazareva (2006a) and (2006b), Haaparanta and 
Juurikkala (2007) and Solanko (2006). 
13 Similar results, available on request, were obtained with sales per employee as the dependent variable. 
14 A dummy was constructed for the largest shareholder (insiders, private, state, foreign, other). The category “insiders” 
includes employers and managers. The category “private” includes both private individuals and private Russian compa-
nies. The category “state” includes all three levels of government in Russia. Large Russian firms are typically controlled 
by a single type of owner. 
 and industry. We proxy the level of capital with a 
dummy variable (invest) indicating whether the firm carried out major investments during 2000-
2002. Internationality of a firm is measured as the percentage of firm sales exported in 2002. The Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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firm’s financing situation is proxied with the interest rate that it would have to pay for a short-term 
bank loan.  
Our results (see Table 4) suggest production and support of infrastructure are positively 
linked to performance, a finding that conforms with Brown and Earle (2000). The coefficients are 
positive for railway support and electricity production when regressing on profit per employee in 
2002. We also see evidence of a negative effect from infrastructure interruptions (heat) on perform-
ance. Social service provision, however, seems to be a burden as the coefficient on housing provi-
sion is negative.
15
4.2   Operational reliability: Participation in infrastructure provision 
 
A potential bias arises in OLS estimates as infrastructure and social good supply and per-
formance are possibly determined simultaneously. We are able to partly alleviate this endogeneity 
problem by running regressions with the same independent variables with 2003 performance fig-
ures. The main results reported in Table 4 remain unchanged.  
How do these results coincide with our model implications? First, it seems that the prob-
ability gains from firm’s infrastructure provision are large enough to translate into an identifiable 
increase in profits. On the other hand, social good provision seems to be a financial burden; and ob-
servation that matches both the opinions of surveyed firm managers and our regression results. So 
why would firms continuing to provide social services? One possibility is that social services are an 
important part of the compensation package that the firm provides its employees. Alternatively, 
there may be a danger that reducing social service provision will harm the firm’s relations with lo-
cal authorities. In any case, the results suggest that firms in Russia are unable to act optimally with 
respect to social goods provision and are locked into a bad equilibrium created by social and institu-
tional conditions specific to Russia. 
 
 
Our model suggests that firms provide the infrastructure good even though this only increases the 
probability of the good state and therefore increases their expected profits. We showed above that 
interruptions in municipal infrastructure provision decrease firm profits, while support to local in-
frastructure increases profits. The unique data further allow us to examine the determinants of infra-
structure provision by the firm. Here, we concentrate on the determinants of private support for a 
municipal district heating system. Supporting municipal district heating system is one of the most 
widespread ways forms of private support for municipal infrastructure according to the 
                                                 
15 For a more thorough discussion on these control variables, see the earlier version of this paper (Leppänen et al., 
2008).   
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HSE/CEFIR/BOFIT data. We show that Russian firms react to interruptions in infrastructure deliv-
ery by increasing their support for municipal infrastructure provision. 
Column three in Table 4 reports our results for a Probit regression of the firm’s contribu-
tion to municipal heating. The dependent variable (heatsup) is coded one if the firm provided finan-
cial or non-financial support to municipal heat supply in 2002. The same set of firm control vari-
ables as in the performance estimations are used. Our results indicate that heat interruptions moti-
vate firms to get involved in supporting municipal heat provision. (On average, an increase of ten 
interruption days in heat delivery raises the probability of supporting municipal heat delivery by 
four percent). With respect to our model, this result could be interpreted as dI/dB>0, whereby the 
combination of increased marginal probability effect and inheritance is sufficiently large to make 
participation in I rational after weakened infrastructure supply to the firm.  
 




  eprofit02  eprofit03  Heatsup 
Elec_prod  54.75  73.13   
  (2.38)**  (2.05)**   
Railsup  28.42  37.91   
  (2.16)**  (2.34)**   
Housing2002  -10.62  2.67   
  (-2.02)**  (0.26)   
Heat interruption days  -0.55  -1.97  0.004 
  (-1.89)*  (-5.46)***  (2.22)** 
Ln(employment2002)      -0.036 
      (-0.76) 
Ln(employment2003)      0.059 
      (1.88)* 
Invest  0.88  12.56  -0.050 
  (0.12)  (1.16)  (-0.68) 
Municipality size  0.0032  -0.0013  -0.0002 
  (1.86)*  (-0.54)  (-2.21)** 
Share of exports  0.31  0.43  0.0001 
  (1.75)*  (1.78)*  (0.11) 
Constant  33.15  93.34   
  (1.21)  (2.05)**   
No. of observations  229  229  188 
Prob > F / Chi
2  0.0002  0.000  0.048 
R
2 / Pseudo R
2  0.32  0.30  0.20 
a. t- and z-values for OLS and Probit in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors used in all regressions. Federal dis-
trict, industry, ownership and market power dummies included in all regressions but not reported. b. Results concerning the probit 
regression are reported in average marginal effects on Prob(y=1) and their z-values. Marginal effects were obtained through Stata’s 
“margeff” module. 
***Significant at 1% level, **Significant at 5% level, *Significant at 10% level. Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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4.3  Operational reliability: Participation in social service provision  
 
Our model assumes that provision of social services positively affect the probability of a good state, 
i.e. qS>0. In addition to obvious gains such as better worker health, enterprises may use social ser-
vice provision as an attachment tool and diminish production risks resulting from departing staff. 
Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006b) show that firms use social services as non-wage benefits to em-
ployees in tight labor markets to increase labor attachment, and thus decrease labor turnover. Im-
proved labor attachment increases productivity and decreases the monetary and time costs of replac-
ing workers that quit. Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006b) further demonstrate that the strongest reduc-
tions in turnover concern blue-collar workers and that improved access to local service provision 
diminishes the share of non-wage benefits. Thus, social goods provision increases the probability of 
a good state by increasing operational reliability through labor attachment. 
 
4.4   Operational reliability: Relations with the public sector 
 
In the above discussion, we saw that firms use participation in infrastructure and social goods pro-
duction as a means of increasing operational reliability via more reliable infrastructure delivery and 
labor attachment. The third channel for increasing operational reliability consists of relations with 
local authorities. There is evidence that Russian enterprises that provide infrastructure or social 
goods are able to extract favors from the local government. Juurikkala and Lazareva (2006a) show 
that enterprises use their social assets as leverage to extract benefits from the local public sector. 
They find that firms that divested their social assets later received greater financial benefits from the 
local authorities, especially in poor localities. They also find that firms operating in highly competi-
tive environments divested later than their counterparts, suggesting that social assets may have been 
used to lobby authorities to help shield firms from competition. Solanko (2006) identifies evidence 
that firms involved in heat provision were more likely to receive financial benefits from the authori-
ties. These findings support our argument that enterprises may increase their operational reliability, 
i.e. the probability of the good state through a combination of infrastructure and social good provi-
sion and relations with local authorities. 
To explicitly test the perceived ability of enterprises to affect official decision-making, we 
construct a dummy variable with a value of one if the general manager expresses the view that his 
enterprise has been able to influence local or regional decision-making. A simple Probit regression 
was used to test for determinants of the ability of firms to influence local or regional public admini-
stration. The results reported in the first two columns of Table 5 suggest that participation in infra- 
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soc provision enhances firms’ chances to influence public decision-making. As expected, larger en-
terprises in smaller jurisdictions have a higher probability of influencing activities by local or re-
gional authorities. The form of ownership, however, does not seem to be decisive. Compared to in-
sider-owned enterprises, only foreign owned-firms differ in having significantly smaller chances of 
influencing the behavior of authorities. Unremarkably, enterprises supporting municipal district 
heating systems have a significantly higher probability of influencing local or regional decision-
making.  
The results indicate that engagement in infrasoc provision helps enterprises maintain good 
relations with the local administration and extract benefits from it. Moreover, local administrations 
are not passive, but rather they have strong incentive to ensure continuity of infrasoc provision from 
firms. The survey data offer us an indirect measure to proxy for the bargaining power of local ad-
ministrations. We are able to construct dummy variables on the expected consequences after hypo-
thetical infrasoc divestment. Thus, worse_heat has an outcome of one if a general manager thinks 
his firm’s relations with the local authorities could worsen and/or the firm’s taxes unrelated to heat-
ing system might increase if the firm ceases to provide heating. Variable worse_medic is con-
structed similarly for medical facilities divestment. We use these variables as additional explanatory 
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 Table 5  Infra-social participation and public relations 
PROBIT
a  munic_capture  regio_capture  Heat prov
  Medic prov 
LNpopulation  -0.048  -0.034  -0.100  -0.016 
  (-1.67)*  (-1.24)  (-3.89)***  (-0.67) 
LNemp02  0.106  0.065  0.061  0.024 
  (1.70)*  (1.05)  (2.11)**  (0.45) 
LNsales02
b  0.028  0.044    -0.042 
  (0.66)  (1.09)    (-1.09) 
Invest  -0.072  -0.051  0.106  -0.100 
  (-0.82)  (-0.62)  1.39  (-1.52) 
Owner: Private  -0.023  0.087  0.120  -0.003 
  (-0.33)  (1.25)  (1.94)*  (-0.04) 
Owner: State  -0.130  0.065  0.132  -0.036 
  (-1.21)  (0.58)  (1.48)  (-0.38) 
Owner: Foreign  -0.240  -0.030  -0.175  0.117 
  (-2.09)**  (-0.23)  (-1.76)*  (1.37) 
Owner: Other  0.045  0.130  0.211   
  (0.27)  (0.83)  (1.77)*   
Heat support  0.164  0.210     
  (1.75)*  (2.18)**     
Heat_pre90      0.257   
      (3.44)***   
Worse_heat      0.168   
      (2.83)***   
Medic_pre90        0.153 
        (1.56) 
Worse_medic        0.201 
        (4.39)*** 
         
Prob > Chi
2  0.04  0.02  0.000  0.01 
Pseudo R
2  0.11  0.12  0.34  0. 21 
No. of observations  237  239  195  175 
 a. Probit regression results are reported in average marginal effects on Prob(y=1) and with  
     their z-values. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors used. Federal district, industry and market power  
     dummies are included, but not reported. 
 b. LNsales02 variable was dropped from the heat provision estimation as it did not have a major effect on the most interesting  
     variables, but it made LNemp02 insignificant most likely due multicollinearity.This was not the case for provision of medical  
     services, so both are included. 
 
For the dependant dummy variables, we use heat and medical provision to outsiders. These are 
coded one if the firm provides the service outside its own premises and to people who are not its 
employees. Here, it is natural to use the provision to outsiders variable as this is the clearest exam-
ple of firms covering the responsibilities of the authorities.
16
                                                 
16 These two outcome variables were selected as they are the most common social services that firms offer to outside 
users. See Table 3.  
 The results − robust for the control 
variable selections – appear in columns three and four of Table 5. Our regressions show that if the 
firm expects authority relations to worsen if it gets out of the heating business, there is a seventeen 
percent higher probability that the firm will continue to provide heating than a firm that does not  
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perceive such a threat. For medical service provision, the effect is some twenty percent. Thus, the 
threat of worsening relations with the local administration seems to keep the current system in op-
eration. The authority risk, together with labor market considerations, may indeed be the reason a 
firm gets locked into a bad equilibrium of producing non-profitable social services. These results 
are in line with Solanko (2006), who shows that heat provision by Russian enterprises is largely ex-
plained by relations with the local public sector and inherited factors. The legacy factor is also ad-
dressed in Table 5 through dummy variables coded as one if the firm had a heating plant and medi-
cal facilities already in the socialist time (heat_pre90 and medic_pre90). Interestingly, while heat 
provision is strongly explained by inheritance, the medical provision is not. This certainly reflects 
the lower capital intensity of providing basic medical services. 
 
 
5  Conclusions  
 
The Russian practice of firms participating in the provision of infrastructure and social services has 
its roots in the Soviet economic system. Although the planned economy ended almost twenty years 
ago, companies, especially those in towns dedicated to a single large industry, continue to support 
infrastructure and social services to this day. Utilizing a theoretical model and a unique survey data 
from large Russian enterprises, we analyzed the rationale for such behavior in an ostensibly market-
driven economy. Based on earlier related studies and new results, we are argue that the complex 
involvement of Russian firms in infrastructure and social good provision can largely be distilled 
down to two factors. First, firms participate in the provision of infrastructure and social service to 
enhance their operational reliability. Second, the Soviet era legacy of physical facilities and institu-
tions continues to linger in the background. 
We constructed a simple model of firm behavior under uncertainty to make our argument. 
As the starting point, we assumed the firms can influence the probability of a good state by engag-
ing in infrastructure and social services provision. The provision of these goods affects the firm’s 
operational reliability through three channels. Firms may contribute to infrastructure provision to 
improve the availability and quality of basic infrastructure services in order to assure smooth pro-
duction, they may use social services to attach workers in tight labor markets, and they may use the 
provision levels as a bargaining tool in dealing with local authorities. Simo Leppänen, Mikael Linden and Laura Solanko 
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Using data from a large enterprise survey to empirically support the main features of the 
model, our theoretical and empirical results show that physical inheritance plays a major role in de-
termining the extent to which firms participate in infrastructure and social good provision. This is 
natural as the costs of participation are considerably lower with inherited capital. Institutional lega-
cies may help explain why some firms provide excess amount of social goods eating up their prof-
its. If genuine corporate social responsibility is present in the Russian case, this, to our mind, is the 
strongest evidence of its existence. 
The practice of firms’ participation in infrastructure and social service provision of infra-
structure and social goods is likely to continue as long as the public sector is unable to meet its 
mandates. Russian institutions remain weak, and facilities inherited by firms from the Soviet times 
are still serviceable. While the mutual benefits of this arrangement between the public and private 
sector might be rational in the short term, the long-term impacts on growth and efficiency are likely 
to be negative. On the other hand, despite the long period of economic growth prior to 2008 crisis, 
the Russian public sector is still unable to provide these services in full. Without the active partici-
pation of firms, many citizens would be deprived of daily necessities and services taken for granted 
in most of the developed world.  
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Appendix I 
 
Totally differentiating first order condition A1) with respect to q, B and L = L*  gives:                    
[ ] ... ) )( 2 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ' ) ' )( 1 ( ' '
2 2 2 + − − − + + − − S w U q Q qU S w Q qU dL µ ϕ µ ϕ  
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] . 0 ' ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ' ) 2 ( ' )( ( ' ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ' ) 2 ( ' )( ( ... = + − + + + − + + ϕ µ ϕ µ Q U U U S w dB Q U U U S w q dB B  
 
Rearranging gives equation (5). Totally differentiating first-order condition B1) with respect to B  
and I = I*  gives:                    
[ ] ... ) 2 ( ' ' )) 2 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ' ' ( )) 1 ( ' ) 2 ( ' ( 2 )) 2 ( ) 1 ( (
2 2 + + − + − + − U U U q U U q U U q dI I II µ µ µ  
       [ ] 0 ) 2 ( ' ) 2 ( ( ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ... = + − − + µ µ U q U q U q U q dB B IB B IB  . 
 
Rearranging gives equation (6). Totally differentiating first order condition C1) with respect to B  
and S = S*   
... ) ' ' ' ' ' ' )( 1 ( ' ) ' ' )( 1 ( ' ' ) ' ' )( 1 ( ' 2 ) 1 ( [
2 2 2 + + + − + − + ϕ ϕ µ ϕ µ ϕ Q L Q qLU L Q qU L Q U q U q dS S SS  
          ... ] ) 2 ( ' ' ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ' 2 ) 2 ( ...
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Appendix II 
 
Table 6.  Description of main variables 
Dependent variables
a           
  Description  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
eprofit02  Profit per employee in 2002  359  18.87  47.47  -83.95  274.96 
eprofit03  Profit per employee in 2003  359  19.83  65.16  -
139.89  490.31 
esales02  Sales per employee in 2002  376  318.78  266.85  3.90  1527.80 
esales03  Sales per employee in 2003  369  435.59  418.84  15.28  2580.20 
munic_capture  Dummy=1if firm admits to have ability to 
influence relevant local / regional legisla-
tion  
375  0.44  0.50  0  1 
regio_capture  386  0.36  0.48  0  1 
Heat prov  Dummy=1if firm provides heat to outsid-
ers  404  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Heat support  Dummy=1 if firm provided non- or finan-
cial support to municipal heating system  403  0.17  0.37  0  1 
Medic prov  Dummy=1 if firm has medical facilities in 
its books  376  0.72  0.45  0  1 
 
Independent variables 
         
  Description  Obs.  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
LNemp02  Log of employment in 2002  390  6.82  0.92  1.79  10.50 
LNsales02  Log of sales in 2003  375  12.24  1.32  7.90  16.13 
Population  Population of firm's municipality in 1000s  401  1239.77  2265.88  15.6  8304.6 
Invest  Dummy=1 if firm has had major capital 
investments in 2000-2002  402  0.82  0.38  0  1 
Interest  Estimated annual interest firm would 
have to pay for a short term bank loan  333  20.19  4.46  0  39 
Export02  Share of exports of all sales in 2002, in 
%  399  11.29  20.73  0  100 
Elec_prod  Dummy=1 if firm produces electricity  404  0.04  0.21  0  1 
Railsup  Dummy=1 if firm provided non- or finan-
cial support to municipal railway system  403  0.08  0.27  0  1 
Heat_pre90  Dummy=1 if firm had heating boilers 
already in Soviet times  403  0.58  0.49  0  1 
Heat interr. days  Number of interruption days in municipal 
heat supply to firm  399  1.16  6.48  0  90 
Worse_heat 
Dummy=1 if manager believes heat di-
vestment --> worse relations and/or 
higher taxes 
276  0.27  0.44  0  1 
House02  Dummy=1 if firm owned or supported 
staff housing in 2002  404  0.39  0.49  0  1 
Medic_pre90  Dummy=1 if firm had medical facilities 
already in Soviet times  403  0.77  0.42  0  1 
Worse_medic 
Dummy=1 if manager believes medical 
divestment --> worse relations and/or 
higher taxes 
301  0.19  0.40  0  1 
a. Note that heatprov and heatsup are also used as independent variables. 
b. We remove one percent of the performance variables’ tails to exclude the obvious outliers.   Earlier BOFIT Discussion Papers 
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